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This research seeks to identify the underlying factors in the production of 
nationalism. Using the World Values Survey to establish levels of nationalist attitudes, 
the author uses quantitative analysis to examine how levels of nationalism change in 
response to nationalistic terminology transmitted through online news media. 
Additionally, this thesis analyzes the relationship between press freedom and levels of 
nationalist word use in the online news media. The findings demonstrate that a free press 
has a positive effect on the use of some forms of nationalist terminology in the news and 
a negative effect on others. The evidence also shows that certain nationalist terminology 
in news media is associated with substantial increases in nationalist attitudes. These 
findings show promise for better understanding of factors that can be manipulated to 
influence levels of nationalism within a country. 
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With the recent United States (U.S.) Presidential election, the British decision to exit 
the European Union (EU), and nationalist leaders and parties in Europe gaining political 
ground, these societies appear to be embracing nationalism to an increasing degree. This rise 
of nationalism and its ability to unite or divide communities, can have security implications 
globally as nationalist parties quite often attempt to repress communities they identify as 
their opposition. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the mechanisms that promote 
nationalism. 
Nationalism has been defined many ways. Ernest Gellner defines nationalism as “the 
striving to make culture and polity congruent, to endow a culture with its own political roof, 
and not more than one roof at that.”1 In this definition, the homogenous culture, organized 
within a government structure, is often based on language, geography, ethnicity, or a 
historical past (whether real or imagined) that binds the community together. While any 
state can have multiple nations within it, each of those nations can choose to fight for 
political representation and sometimes independence, or can live peacefully within the 
greater nation. As I will demonstrate, nationalist parties are quite often intolerant of 
outsiders or sub-nations within the state that can be perceived as a threat to political cultural 
congruency.  
Because nationalism can be based on many factors, such as culture, race, historical 
past, or geography, it is important to examine how these factors are utilized for nationalist 
purposes. A nation’s culture changes in many ways over time, including through 
immigration, technological advances, and war. Examples of this phenomenon have been 
demonstrated with mass immigration into Europe from Syria due to war, and the continuous 
technological advances of modern societies, similarly to how Western Europe experienced 
American cultural diffusion after World War II. At that time, American GIs brought over 
rock and roll music with artists such as Elvis Presley, resulting in West Germany becoming 
                                                 
1 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 42. 
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the second largest U.S. rock and roll market in the world.2 Nazi Germany, in contrast, based 
its nationality on race and ethnicity.3 Countries such as Israel base their nationalism on 
Zionism and a historic past that links it to the geography.4  
These approaches to nationalism have all used mass media outlets as a method to 
spread such nationalist sentiments, often through propaganda.5 Adena et al. found that the 
Nazis’ use of radio to spread propaganda resulted in a positive response by listeners who 
were predisposed to anti-Semitism and a negative response by those whose prior attitudes 
contradicted the propaganda.6 They found that “restrictions of extremist speech are an 
important element helping mass media to serve as a safeguard of democracy” and that in an 
autocracy, dictators can use propaganda to build support and stabilize a country.7 Another 
example of mass media’s ability to influence nationalism is seen in the Rwandan genocide, 
where radio propaganda encouraged the Hutu to commit genocide and kill the Tutsi, 
accounting for an estimated “10 percent of overall participation” in the violent acts.8 Israelis 
and Palestinians have also accused each other of using the media to spread nationalist 
                                                 
2 John Dean, “A Diffusion of American Culture in Western Europe since World War Two: A 
Crosscultural Survey,” Journal of American Culture 20, no. 4 (December 1997): 11-24, 10.1111/j.1542-
734X.1997.t01-1-00011.x. 
3 Aristotle Kallis, Fascist Ideology Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945 
(New York,NY: Routledge, 2002). 
4 “Politics in Israel Is Increasingly Nationalist,” Economist, May 20, 2017, 
https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21722031-israels-politicians-promote-religion-and-
intolerance-politics-israel-increasingly. 
5 Marjan Malesic, “Massmedia, Propaganda and Nationalism,” Res Publica 39, no. 2, (1997): 245-
257;  Stefano Della Vigna and Ethan Kaplan, “The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, (August 2007):1187-1234, http://search.proquest.com/docview/
36702070/; Zhongshi Guo, Weng Hin Cheong, and Huailin Chen, “Nationalism as Public Imagination: The 
Media’s Routine Contribution to Latent and Manifest Nationalism in China,” The International 
Communication Gazette 69 no. 5 (October 2007): 467-480, https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048507080873; 
Jeffrey Herf, “Nazi Germany’s Propaganda Aimed at Arabs and Muslims During World War II and the 
Holocaust: Old Themes, New Archival Findings.” Central European History 42, no. 4 (December 2009): 
709-736, 10.1017/S000893890999104X; Maja Adena et al., “Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar 
Germany,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130, no. 4 (January 2015): 1885-1939, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1698196432/; Stefano Della Vigna et al., “Cross-Border Media and 
Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 
6, no.3 (2011): 103-132, 10.1257/app.6.3.103. 
6 Adena et al., “Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany,” 1890. 
7 Adena et al., “Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany,” 1935. 
8 David Yanagizawa-Drott, “Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, no. 4 (November 2014): 1989, 10.1093/qje/qju020. 
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propaganda.9 This points to the need for closer analysis of the relationship between mass 
media communications and the creation of nationalist attitudes. 
A. METHOD 
This thesis will attempt to answer the following research questions: How does press 
freedom affect the production of nationalist terminology by a country’s mass media and 
what are the effects of those images and narratives on nationalist attitudes within that 
country? To do this, I have conducted a quantitative analysis of the relationship between 
press freedom and nationalist terminology in online news media content, and the 
relationship between nationalist terminology and levels of nationalist attitudes.  
In order to identify any relationship between country-level press freedom and 
nationalist terminology, this research conducts a quantitative analysis of press freedom as 
reported by Freedom House and levels of nationalist terminology used in the online news 
media. Additionally, this research will attempt to identify any relationship between 
nationalistic terminology used in the online news and levels of nationalist sentiments 
measured through the World Values Survey. 
I hypothesize that higher levels of press freedom are associated with increased 
production of nationalist mass media narratives. In nations such as the United Kingdom, 
United States, Germany, and France where there is a free press, there is room for more 
narrow, “ethnic” or “sectarian” forms of nationalism to use mass media to challenge the 
dominant nationalism. On the other hand, in nations with a censored or partly censored 
press, such as Turkey and Hungary, there is less tolerance of outsiders who could challenge 
the dominant nationalism using mass media. While a censored press likely also produces 
nationalist terminology in the news media, I hypothesize that it does so at a lesser rate than a 
free press. Additionally, I hypothesize that the amount of media narrative concerning 
nationalism is correlated with subsequent levels of nationalism within a country. 
Specifically, as nationalist terminology increases in mass media, we should expect that 
                                                 
9 “Palestinian civil war is ‘Israeli media propaganda’, minister says,” BBC Monitoring Middle East 
(November 2006), http://search.proquest.com/docview/458650933/; “Sharon Tells Palestinians to End 
Anti-Israeli Propaganda (text),” BBC Monitoring Middle East (November 2004), 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/459214184/. 
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nationalist attitudes, whether dominant or not, will also rise. For the same reasons, as the 
media’s use of nationalist terminology decreases, we should expect that nationalist attitudes 
will also be reduced.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE  
Understanding the role nationalism has played in recent events is crucial to 
understanding how important it is to national security. Many have argued that English 
nationalism was a contributing factor in the 2016 British referendum vote to leave the 
European Union.10 Lord Ashcroft conducted an exit poll of 12,369 voters after they had cast 
their votes. Of those who voted for the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the EU, 49% said the 
biggest single reason for leaving was “the principle that decisions about the UK should be 
taken in the UK,” while 33% said the main reason was “that leaving offered the best chance 
for the UK to regain control over immigration and its own borders.”11 Politicians such as 
Nigel Farage used immigration concerns to rally votes. He used examples of refugee 
criminal and terrorist behavior, in Germany and Belgium,12 to incite fear and make 
immigration a security risk for U.K. The free press in Britain13 seems to have allowed those 
such as Farage to spread a nationalist narrative, which challenged British Prime Minister 
David Cameron’s narrative to stay in the EU. The media captured this nationalist sentiment 
in the online daily news but also captured the sentiment of those who opposed Farage.14 
                                                 
10 Harry Brown, “Post-Brexit Britain: Thinking about ‘English Nationalism’ as a Factor in the EU 
Referendum.” International Politics Review 5, (June 2017): 1–12, 10.1057/s41312-017-0023-7; Ana Carolina 
Balthazar, “Made in Britain: Brexit, teacups, and the materiality of the nation,” American Ethnologist 44, no 2 
(May 2017): 220–224, 10.1111/amet.12471; Ailsa Henderson, et al., “England, Englishness and Brexit.” The 
Political Quarterly 87, no 2, (April 2016): 187–199, 10.1111/1467-923X.12262. 
11 Michael Ashcroft, “How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday…and Why,” Lord Ashcroft Polls, 
accessed August 27, 2017, http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/.  
12 Darren McCaffrey, “Farage Warns Over Sex Attackers and Terrorists,” Sky News, April 29, 2016,  
http://news.sky.com/story/farage-warns-over-sex-attackers-and-terrorists-10262663.; Owen Bennett, “There 
will be More Cologne-Style Sex Attacks if Turkey Joins the EU, Claims Nigel Farage,” Huffington Post UK, 
April 29, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/nigel-farage-turkey-brexit-eu-
referendum_uk_57234a8ae4b0d6f7bed5d801. 
13 According to Freedom House’s Press Freedom Report, the UK had a highly free press that earned a 
score of 25 out of 100;”Freedom of the Press 2016,” Freedom House, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-press/freedom-press-2016. 
14 Andrew Rawnsley and Toby Helm, “David Cameron on the Prospect of Brexit, ‘Leave Want to Take 
the Country Backwards,” The Guardian, June 11, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/11/
david-cameron-brexit-eu-referendum-listen-jeremy-corbyn. 
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Nations with a censored press would likely have denied the expression of views which 
contradicted the ruling party’s narrative. 
In 2016, the United States elected President Donald Trump. One of President 
Trump’s campaign promises was to conduct immigration reform. He promised a ban on 
Muslim immigrants, and to build a wall on the United States–Mexico border to stop illegal 
immigration.15 President Trump used social media to speak out about terrorist attacks, using 
them to justify a ban on Muslims presumably in order to prevent further Islamist-related 
terror attacks in the United States.16 He stated that his wall would stop the illegal drug flow 
into the United States and help bring back jobs impacted by illegal immigration.17 The 
media has had no problems capturing the president’s comments while providing the views 
of those who challenge his statements. While the United States has a free press,18 President 
Trump has routinely called his opposition “Fake News.”   
In Turkey, nationalism is closely linked to political Islam.19 While Turkey is a 
democracy with an elected president and religious freedom, some sources argue non-
Muslims are not found in government positions, including army officers, policemen, or 
judges.20 On 15 July 2016, Tukey experienced a failed military coup d’état.21 This coup 
                                                 
15 Amanda Holpuch, “Trump Re-ups Controversial Muslim Ban and Mexico Wall in First Campaign 
Ad,” The Guardian, January 4, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/04/donald-trump-great-
again-first-campaign-ad-isis-mexico-wall-muslim-ban. 
16 “All Tweets from @realDonaldTrump that Include the Word ‘Muslim’ or ‘Muslims’ Since Donald 
Trump Declared his Candidacy for President on June 16, 2015,” National Immigration Law Center,  accessed 
August 27, 2017, https://www.nilc.org/issues/litigation/trump-tweets-with-muslim-muslims/. 
17 Philip Bump, “Here’s What Donald Trump Said in his Big Immigration Speech, Annotated,” The 
Washington Post, August 31, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/08/31/heres-
what-donald-trump-said-in-his-big-immigration-speech-annotated/?utm_term=.71ca66d65248; U.S. News 
Staff, “Read: Donald Trump’s Acceptance Speech,” U.S. News, July 21, 2016, https://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2016-07-21/read-donald-trumps-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-the-republican-convention. 
18”Freedom of the Press 2016.” 
19 Toni Alaranta, “Turkish Islamism and Nationalism Before and After the Failed Coup Attempt,” The 
Turkey Analyst, December 1, 2016, https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/
569-turkish-islamism-and-nationalism-before-and-after-the-failed-coup-attempt.html.  
20 Orhan Kemal Cengiz, “Could Turkey’s Christians Wear Police Uniforms?” Al-Monitor, October 16, 
2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/turkey-urges-christians-join-police.html; Omer 
Taspinay, Review of Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk? by Soner 
Cagaptay, The Middle East Journal 60 no. 4 (October 2006): 815. 
21 “Turkey’s Failed Coup Attempt: All You Need to Know,” Al Jazeera, July 15, 2017, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/turkey-failed-coup-attempt-161217032345594.html.  
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attempt is an example of a community within Turkey which challenged the current 
government for political representation. In response, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
capitalized on the coup with the 2017 Turkish Constitutional Referendum where he won 
51% of the votes,22 granting him extensive executive powers. President Erdogan used the 
coup attempt to fire over 100,000 people and arrest 50,000 people believed to be his 
political opposition.23 Additionally, he has arrested journalists and raided media outlets for 
reporting on protests over irregularities in the referendum.24 News media outlets outside of 
Turkey captured these events with condemnation while any attempt to do so within Turkey 
would surely result in arrest.25  
In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban has repeatedly challenged the E.U. 
concerning refugees and immigration. He has called the mass of asylum seekers in Europe 
“a poison,” saying that Hungary did not need a single immigrant, and that “every single 
migrant poses a public security and terror risk.”26 In a speech in Malta, Orban warned that 
“migration turned out to be the Trojan horse of terrorism” and that Europe’s “Christian 
identity” was under threat.27 Orban has said the government must be “in the hands of 
nationalist forces.”28 Hungary has released an official leaflet falsely claiming that London 
had “no-go” areas due to illegal immigrants, while also claiming that terrorists deliberately 
                                                 
22 Patrick Kingsley, “Erdogan Claims Vast Powers in Turkey After Narrow Victory in Referendum,” 
The New York Times, April 16, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/world/europe/turkey-referendum-
polls-erdogan.html?mcubz=0. 
23 “Turkey’s Failed Coup Attempt: All You Need to Know.”  
24 “Journalists Detained in Wake of Turkey Referendum,” Committee to Protect Journalists, April 21, 
2017, https://cpj.org/2017/04/journalists-detained-in-wake-of-turkey-referendum.php. 
25 Turkey’s press freedom score was a 71 in 2016 and worsened to 76 in 2017; both of these scores 
indicate that Turkey does not have a free press; ”Freedom of the Press 2016.” 
26 “Hungarian Prime Minister Says Migrants are ‘Poison’ and ‘Not Needed,’” The guardian, July 26, 
2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/26/hungarian-prime-minister-viktor-orban-praises-
donald-trump.  
27 Jim Brunsden, “Orban: E.U.’s ‘Christian Identity’ Under Threat From Muslim Migrants,” Financial 
Times, March 30, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/7ecde2c2-af12-329a-9133-29a7bee08e31. 




blend in with immigrants in Paris, Brussels, and Berlin.29 Orban’s government has erected 
walls covered in razor wire along its borders to stop the flow of refugees.30 Orban’s 
nationalist political party has passed legislation to more strictly control the media, and made 
changes to the constitution restricting political advertising and reducing the checks and 
balances of the judiciary branch.31 On October 2, 2016 Hungary held a referendum to 
determine whether it should accept the E.U.’s proposed refugee resettlement plan. While a 
majority, 98%, of those who voted opposed the resettlement, turnout totaled under 44%, 
making the referendum invalid.32 NPR’s Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson commented on Morning 
Edition that voters were telling her that Hungary “‘is a Christian country’” and “‘they 
wanted it undiluted by immigrants, and they want to preserve the Hungarian culture.’”33 
Those who opposed the referendum within Hungary were able to use some forms of media 
to challenge Orban’s stance on immigration. One party crowdsourced a $150,000 billboard 
and poster campaign to mock and counter the referendum.34 
Finally, in 2017, both France and Germany had presidential elections and both 
nations experienced rising nationalist parties. Marine Le Pen’s National Front party in 
France gained political ground on its anti-European and anti-immigration stance by focusing 
on the terrorist threat, the refugee crisis, and immigration.35 Similarly, Germany’s 
Alternative for Germany (AfD) party saw a spike in popularity during the refugee crisis, 
                                                 
29 “Deport Migrants to Secure Camps, Says Hungary’s Prime Minister,” Sky News, September 22, 2016, 
http://news.sky.com/story/deport-migrants-to-secure-camps-says-hungarys-prime-minister-10588475.  
30 “Hungarian Prime Minister Says Migrants are ‘Poison’ and ‘Not Needed.”; “Deport Migrants to 
Secure Camps, Says Hungary’s Prime Minister.”  
31 Dalibor Rohac, “Hungary’s Goulash Authoritarianism,” Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2014, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/hungarys-goulash-authoritarianism-1393534188; “What to do When Viktor 
Orban Erodes Democracy,” Economist, June 22, 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21723835-
europe-has-tools-make-autocrat-back-down-what-do-when-viktor-orban-erodes-democracy. 
32 Camila Domonoske, “Hungary’s Referendum on Refugee Resettlement is Overwhelming but 
Invalid,” NPR, October 3, 2016, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/03/496376263/hungarian-
referendum-on-refugees-is-overwhelming-but-invalid.  
33 Domonoske, “Hungary’s Referendum.” 
34 Domonoske, “Hungary’s Referendum.” 
35 Angelique Chrisafis, “Marine Le Pen Defeated but France’s Far Right is Far from Finished,” The 
Guardian, May 7, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/07/marine-le-pen-defeated-
front-national-far-from-finished.  
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hitting a high of support in September 2016, only to drop as immigration concerns slowed.36 
The AfD continued to campaign on immigration, calling the wave of newcomers a burden 
on the education system, the cause of increased crime, and an “Islamization of society.”37 
While neither of these parties won their respective elections, nationalist popularity during 
the refugee crisis appears to have spiked based on the xenophobic fears they campaigned on. 
Both nations have a free press38 which allowed the media to effectively capture the opinions 
of both parties and their opposition.  
The political implication from the rising nationalism, as demonstrated, can affect 
security as countries nationalist parties attempt to restrict press freedom and create out-
groups. The examples all show the use of an in-group and an out-group while promoting a 
form of nationalism. The countries with a free press all experienced rising nationalist parties 
or agendas that were competing for political authority, while the countries with a censored 
or part free press experienced higher levels of nationalism because of a perceived threat to 
the state resulting in attempts to consolidate more power. This research is important to the 
U.S. if it continues to promote democracy or plans to nation-build after it defeats an enemy 
state. Nationalism can help unify a nation fractured by religious or ethnic differences such as 
the current divide between Shia, Sunni, and the Kurds in Iraq. It may also be in the U.S. 
interest to divide a nation and inhibit nationalism that supports a current regime, in countries 
such as North Korea by pursuing strategies to facilitate an anti-nationalist media narrative to 
combat a censored mass media. Regardless of our aims, the examples presented here 
demonstrate how important it is that we understand the mechanisms underlying the 
production of nationalism. 
  
                                                 
36 Jill Petzinger, “Populist Anger in Germany isn’t about Smashing the Elite-it’s Purely about 
Immigrants,” Quartz, August 11, 2017, https://qz.com/1050086/populist-anger-in-germany-isnt-about-
smashing-the-elite-its-purely-about-immigrants/. 
37 Kirsten Grieshaber, “German Nationalists Try Reviving Migration as Election Topic,” ABC 
News, August 21, 2017, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/german-nationalists-reviving-
migration-election-topic-49331918. 
38 “Freedom of the Press 2016.”  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature concerning nationalism is very broad. For this research, I have 
already used Gellner’s terms to help define nationalism, so it would be prudent to 
provide his theory and discuss his views of the interaction between nationalism and the 
media, in addition to examining the work of Benedict Anderson and Carlton Hayes, to 
establish a baseline understanding about nationalism for this research. I will then 
expand my focus down to consider research on press freedom, mass media, propaganda, 
and their effects on nationalism.  
A. NATIONALISM THEORY 
Ernest Gellner’s book, Nations and Nationalism, argues that there are three 
fundamental stages of mankind’s history. First is a pre-agrarian stage, where hunter/
gatherers lived in small groups that prevented the “political division of labor” found in 
states.39 This is followed by an agrarian stage where a literate (specially trained) ruling 
class (high culture) attempted to keep themselves separate from the masses (keeping the 
peasants (low culture) from joining the high culture.40 Finally, we see an industrial 
stage, where the drive for improvement required specialization. This specialization 
required standardized basic education and specialized training, which allowed mobility 
between positions within society.41  
Gellner argues that nationalism is the product of industrialism’s cultural 
homogeneity, and educational and communication standards. Nationalism does not 
cause homogeneity, “it is rather homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable 
imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism.”42 He 
challenges accusations that nationalism causes homogeneity and claims that it is the 
                                                 
39 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 5. 
40 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 16. 
41Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 19–37. 
42 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 38. 
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need for homogeneity which can be seen in nationalism.43 He provides a theory of 
nationality that includes both will and culture. Nationalism selectively uses the pre-
existing, historical cultures and often transforms them into something completely 
different to meet the needs of current conditions.44 
When discussing nationalism and ideology, Gellner argues that the media, 
whether it be radio or print, does not transmit a nationalistic message to a population 
untouched by nationalism. He believes that it is the media themselves based on the 
language and style of transmission, and not the message at all, which generates 
nationalism. Those “who can understand them, or can acquire such comprehension is 
included in a moral and economic community.”45 He states that “what is actually said 
matters little.”46 This is a stark contrast to my thesis, that what is said in the media is 
correlated to levels of nationalism.  
Benedict Anderson’s book, Imagined Communities, argues that nationalism only 
came to be when three cultural conceptions could no longer control people’s minds. 
Anderson believed the decline in these three concepts together with a rise in the ability 
to communicate helped split cosmology from history. In doing so, societies needed 
something that linked them together and he proposes that print media was the source 
people found which identified those new fraternities.47 With rising capitalism, state 
languages were often replaced by more popular languages in print media creating new 
communities. Many states taught the state language in schools to unify a nation often 
destroying less common languages over time. Once these linguistic-based nationalisms 
took hold, official nationalisms were able to develop from powerful groups attempting 
to maintain control being threatened by imagined communities.48  
                                                 
43 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 44. 
44 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 54–55. 
45 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 121–122. 
46 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 122. 
47 Benedict Anderson. Imagined communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso Books, 2006), 36. 
48 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 109–110. 
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Hayes provides a more complicated definition of nationalism and differentiates 
between political nationalism and cultural nationalism. Political nationalism being 
when a cultural nationalism desires to create a nation state while cultural nationalism is 
based on common language and traditions.49 Throughout the text, Hayes routinely 
mentions how economic changes (industrialization) influenced nationalism and the 
importance of the media as a means of spreading nationalism through propaganda. 
Where Hayes differs from Anderson is that Hayes argues that as the industrial age has 
caused people to migrate, they have lost their religious ancestry and possess a natural 
human urge to replace it, often with nationalism.50 Hayes proposes that nationalism is 
present in primitive tribes on a much smaller scale where Anderson believes that 
nationalism is more political and hence did not start till the end of the agrarian age.  
Of importance to this research is the continued reference to the power of the 
media and propaganda. When discussing the French revolution, Hayes mentions the 
importance, above all other factors, of the flood of cheap newspapers and pamphlets 
which catered to public opinion.51 When discussing Napoleonic imperialism, Hayes 
describes how the Habsburg emperor created a propaganda bureau and how there was a 
patriotic reaction to foreign writers against Napoleon.52 Hayes argues that the 
journalism was an outcome of mass schooling ultimately resulting in cheap popular 
journalism based on sensational rather than factual articles and that any group with a 
financial backer could and did publish their propaganda.53 As Anderson has advanced 
Hayes’s theories concerning political nationalism and the impacts of the industrial age, 
this research attempts to advance Hayes’s claims that nationalist propaganda 
(nationalist media narrative) contributes to nationalism.  
                                                 
49 Carlton J.H. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2016), 1–4. 
50 Hayes, Nationalism, 14. 
51 Hayes, Nationalism, 49. 
52 Hayes, Nationalism, 56–57. 
53 Hayes, Nationalism, 79–80. 
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B. MEDIA CENSORSHIP AND NATIONALISM 
Having mentioned some of the prominent works in the field of nationalism, I 
will now turn my attention to research more closely related to the relationship between 
censorship, the media and nationalism. Many studies about the mass media and 
nationalism focus on its influence or control within the public sphere,54 while others 
focus on censorship or press freedom.55 Additionally, there is also research concerning 
propaganda and its influence on nationalism.56 The following pages will provide an 
overview of these works.  
1. Mass Media’s Ability to Influence  
Recent research has demonstrated the ability of the mass media to influence an 
audience. Andrew Calabrese and Barbara Ruth Burke argue that in the United States, 
the media claims a role in representing the American identity. They provide insight to 
where the media gets its narratives and claim that the media presenting an American 
identity is problematic due to who is represented by the media, and who has access to 
media production.57 Because of the influence the media has on nationalism, their 
concern is focused on who has access to broadcast through the media and the message 
they present for American nationalism. 
                                                 
54 T. Camber Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State 
Sovereignty,” International Organization 68, (January 2014): 111–141, 10.1017/S0020818313000350; 
Andrew Calabrese and Barbara Ruth Burke, “American Identities: Nationalism, the Media, and the Public 
Sphere,” Journal of Communication Inquiry 16, no. 2 (June 1992): 52–73, https://doi.org/10.1177/
019685999201600205; Chrystopher Kim, “Naitonalism: the Media, State, and Public in the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Dispute,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 1-122, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/
45206; T. Camber Warren, “Explosive Connections? Mass Media, Social Media, and the Geography of 
Collective Violence in African States,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (February 2015): 297–311, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314558102. 
55 Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,” International 
Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 5-40, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v021/21.2.snyder.html; 
Foerstel, Herbert N., Banned in the Media: A Reference Guide to Censorship in the Press, Motion Pictures, 
Broadcasting, and the Internet. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998) 1-252. 
56 Guntram Henrik Herb. Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda 1918–1945. 
(New York, NY: Routledge, 1997): 1-250; Malesic, “Massmedia, Propaganda and Nationalism,” 245-257. 
57 Calabrese and Burke, “American Identities,” 52–73. 
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While some have claimed that social media was the driving factor in the Arab 
Spring,58 Jon B. Alterman demonstrates that news media outlets had the biggest impact 
on the growing protests in the Arab Spring and that social media only played a 
supporting role.59 While Alterman’s research is focused on broadcast mass media 
which was not censored by Egypt, it demonstrates how citizens connected with the 
media’s representation of Egyptians uniting for political change. Others have also 
identified the media’s ability to influence nationalism in specific countries. Munawar 
Sabir analyzed the role media plays in Pakistani nationalism and concluded that 
because of the influence the media plays, the press must be educated to prevent 
exaggerations and conspiracy stories.60 Stefano Della Vigna et al. identified Serbian 
broadcast radio that reached across borders into Croatia as influencing Croats to switch 
from voting for moderate nationalist parties to ultra nationalist parties. They also 
identified that areas exposed to these broadcasts experienced higher levels of anti-
Serbian graffiti.61 Guo, Cheong, and Chen identify the mass media’s ability to 
construct a unifying national identity in China as a double-edged sword that also creates 
out-groups.62 Wanning Sun’s research in China focused on the differences of state 
sponsored media events and media stories presented by the press. Sun concludes that 
the popular press in China does not exclusively contradict the national narrative but 
registers the anxieties of ordinary citizens.63 
Any review of nationalism and mass media would be incomplete without 
mentioning the role of propaganda. Guntram Herb discusses how Nazi Germany used 
propaganda to promote nationalism. He focuses his attention on the drawing and 
                                                 
58 Ekaterina Stepanova, “The Role of Information Communication Technologies in the “Arab Spring,” 
PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 159, (George Washington University, 2011), 
http://www.ponarseurasia.com/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pepm_159.pdf. 
59 Jon B. Alterman, “The Revolution will not be Tweeted,” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 4 
(October 2011): 103–116, 10.1080/0163660X.2011.610714. 
60 Munawar Sabir, “The Role of Media in Creating Values of Nationalism in Pakistan,” Journal of 
Political Studies 18, no. 2, (December 2011): 17–36, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1059553844/ 
61 Della Vigna et al., “Cross-border media and nationalism,” 103-132.  
62 Guo, Cheong, and Chen, “Nationalism as Public Imagination,” 467-480. 
63 Wanning Sun, “Media Events or Media Stories? Time, Space and Chinese (Trans) Nationalism,” 
International Journal of Cultural Studies 4, no. 1 (March 2001): 25–43, 10.1177/136787790100400102 
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publishing of maps as nationalist propaganda. He presents examples of how German 
nationalism was continuously manipulated based on culture, borders, ethnicity, and 
language, to suit the needs of the government.64 
More recent examples include the use of propaganda in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Marjan Malešič’s provides a qualitative analysis of the use of propaganda in mass 
media to promote nationalism. Malešič participated in research that analyzed news 
articles and broadcasts from Croatia and Serbia concerning the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Malešič identified the former Yugoslavia as having a national identity 
bound to a common national history which changed when Yugoslavia’s political system 
disintegrated.65 He demonstrates how the media used propaganda to spread 
nationalistic narratives to create new national histories and symbols when the 
governments split.  
A study by Yanagizawa-Drott used a dataset of prosecutions of those accused of 
participating in the genocide in Rwanda with radio coverage to analyze the role radio 
propaganda played in the genocide. He identified the Hutu use of radio propaganda as 
contributing to the genocide of the Tutsi.66 A similar study by Adena et al., analyzed 
the role radio played in the rise of the Nazi party as well as the effects radio propaganda 
had on anti-Semitism in Germany.67 They found that Nazi nationalist radio 
“propaganda increased the frequency of expressions of anti-Semitism by ordinary 
Germans.”68 
Camber Warren, in “Not by the Sword Alone,” proposes that “mass media 
technologies facilitate the maintenance of stability and sovereignty by altering the 
structural forces operating on the production and dissemination of normative appeals to 
national unity and state loyalty.”69 In another article, Warren and finds that the vertical 
                                                 
64 Herb. Under the Map of Germany, 1-250. 
65 Malesic, “Massmedia, Propaganda and Nationalism,” 249. 
66 Yanagizawa-Drott, “Propaganda and conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan genocide,” 1947-1994.  
67 Adena et al., “Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany,” 1900. 
68 Adena et al., “Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany,” 1933-1934. 
69 Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone,” 12. 
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integration offered by radio has a pacifying effect over a population.70 Both of 
Warren’s articles demonstrate the ability of mass media to influence a population. This 
thesis looks to demonstrate that this influence to unify a nation or instill state loyalty 
can be applied not only to controlling violence but to levels of nationalism as well. 
Warren argues that “the public nature of mass communication technologies allow 
leaders to convert nationalist images, narratives, and symbols into elements of 
‘common knowledge,’ which are known by all to have been seen by all, and which 
thereby achieve even greater normative impact.”71 I propose that this argument can also 
be applied to the study of nationalist attitudes. 
2. Press Freedom and Nationalism  
Research concerning press freedom’s impact on production of nationalism can 
be split into two categories. Those analyzing censorship of the mass media and those 
analyzing online censorship. Authors such as Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine provide 
a qualitative analysis of the relationship between nationalism and press freedom 
comparing it to an economic market. They argue that control of information in the 
media can be problematic in democratizing societies by identifying the media as 
advertising or soliciting political support through nationalist mythmaking. They 
demonstrate how monopolies on the supply of information can allow a government to 
disseminate a nationalistic narrative with few challengers. They argue that segmented 
democratic markets are conducive to nationalism. Finally, the authors conclude that 
new democracies experiencing a free press face increased nationalistic mythmaking by 
those using monopolies on the information to solicit support from a segmented 
society.72  
Others such as Chrystopher Kim provide quantitative analysis of the media’s 
nationalist narrative and levels of nationalism in Japan and China. He sees the media as 
                                                 
70 Warren, “Explosive connections?” 297–311. 
71 Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone,” 16. 
72 Snyder and Ballentine, “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,” 25. 
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a “transporter of nationalism” between the public and state73 and argues that there is a 
difference in levels of nationalistic narrative based on levels of press freedom. His 
research found a correlation between Japan’s media coverage of the disputed Senkaku/
Diaoyu islands and levels of nationalism but no correlation with China’s media 
coverage of the dispute and nationalism. He attributes this difference to China’s state 
censorship.74 However, Kim’s use of English translated newspapers could have 
affected his conclusions. I believe that, as Kim pointed out in his thesis, media outlets 
often have different priorities and China may tone down the nationalistic narrative for 
the English version of the news. Additionally, the thesis is focused on news articles 
concerning disputed islands but fails to account for other possible articles with 
narratives that could influence levels of nationalism.  
Nationalist messages are also found in online websites, chatrooms, and blogs.75 
These online sources are often censored. Research on this topic often focuses on 
China’s ability to censor online media to promote nationalism. King, Pan, and Roberts 
describe China’s censorship apparatus as the largest in history. Their research compared 
pre and post censored social media posts and found that censorship was aimed at 
stopping collective action by silencing calls for social mobilization against the 
government.76 Ying Jiang divides imposed Chinese Internet censorship into offensive 
and defensive categories. The offensive promotes a narrative the government wants 
while the defensive often removes or replaces a negative narrative. Jiang notes that 
political topics which had previously been self-censored are increasingly being allowed 
as long as they maintain a pro-China perspective as demonstrated in the online 
                                                 
73 Kim, “Naitonalism,” 9. 
74 Kim, “Nationalism;” 36. 
75 Piet Bakker, “New Nationalism: The Internet crusade,” (paper presented at International Studies 
Association Annual Convention, Chicago, IL, February 20-24, 2001), http://www. tamilnation.org/
selfdetermination/nation/bakker.pdf; Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Nationalism and the Internet,” Nations and 
Nationalism 13, no. 1 (January 2007): 1–17, 10.1111/j.1469-8129.2007.00273.x 
76 Gary King, Jennifer Pan and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government 
Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,” The American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (May 
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discussions concerning Tibet in 2008.77 Christopher Cairns and Allen Carlson propose 
that China also uses censorship as a tool to provide an outlet for citizens when political 
pressure is building up. In these instances, the government can reduce or stop 
censorship to allow citizens to express their outrage over controversial issues such as 
the dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.78 The authors 
also argue that government censors were reduced in this event because of nationalist 
sentiment present in Chinese government officials.  
  
                                                 
77 Ying Jiang, Cyber-Nationalism in China. Challenging Western Media Portrayals of Internet 
Censorship in China. (Adelaide, Australia: University of Adelaide Press, 2015), 82. 
78 Christopher Cairns and Allen Carlson, “Real-World Islands in a Social Media Sea: Nationalism and 
Censorship on Weibo during the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Crisis,” The China Quarterly 225, (March 2016): 
23–49, 10.1017/S0305741015001708.  
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III. PERSUASIVE POWER OF THE NEWS MEDIA 
The news is often charged with some form of bias that impacts public opinions 
and perceptions. This is done through selective reporting, or putting a positive or negative 
undertone on the news being reported. Propaganda is also used in the news either through 
the creation of events to report or through the selective reporting of certain facts to 
persuade a nation. The following chapter will examine the persuasive power of the news 
media and examples of how newspapers have used nationalist terminology to spread 
nationalist attitudes. 
A. NEWS MEDIA BIASES 
News media outlets are known to have biases.79 These biases are often called 
frames, slanting, or spin and refer to the manner in which the news is reported. There are 
many suggested explanations for these biases to include, consumer preference, where the 
news media biases their reporting of the news toward what it perceives its consumers 
want,80 or that news outlets maintain the bias from their sources either because they 
agree with the bias or because they want to keep the source producing news for them.81 
In the latter case, the bias may be more about economics. If the news outlet loses the 
source, they may also lose the story to their competition.  
Self-censorship in the news media can also lead to a bias. This is evident in the 
reporting of the news prior to the invasion of Iraq, where many journalists who 
challenged the U.S. government’s claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction were 
                                                 
79 David Niven, “Objective Evidence on Media Bias: Newspaper Coverage of Congressional Party 
Switchers,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 80, no. 2 (June 2003): 311–326, 10.1177/
107769900308000206; Yi Xiang and Kiklos Sarvary, “News Consumption and Media Bias,” Marketing 
Science 26, no. 5 (September 2007): 611–628, 10.1287/mksc.1070.0279; Armando J Garcia-Pires, Hans 
Jarle Kind and Lars Sorgard, News Sources and Media Bias, 1411 (Bergen: Institute for Research in 
Economics and Business Administration, 2012), https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/
166844/A21_12.pdf?sequence=1; Morris, 2007. 
80 Xiang and Sarvary, “News Consumption and Media Bias,” 611–628. 
81 Garcia-Pires, Kind and Sorgard, News Sources and Media Bias.  
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fired. Journalists such as Peter Arnet,82 and Phil Donahue83 were fired for their 
outspoken negative views and statements concerning the war at a time when “nearly two-
thirds of all [news] sources were categorized as pro-war.”84 This example demonstrates 
that countries with a free press are not immune to biased reporting of the news and the 
influence it has on the public.  
News source biases present a problem in accurate reporting of the news. News 
outlets have found themselves having to apologize for inaccurate news due to source 
manipulation of photos and stories. This happened in the U.K. with the reporting of 
British soldiers abusing detainees and the publishing of a false story with fake photos in 
the Daily Mirror.85 In the United States, the Los Angeles Times fired Brian Walski for 
digitally altering photos in a news report from Iraq.86 While both of the news outlets 
corrected their reporting, it raises the question about how many falsely reported articles 
go unchallenged and influence their audience. 
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which essentially argues that words matter, is also 
important to this argument. Sapir, Whorf, and others believe that language and grammar 
influence how people see the world.87 Those who speak different languages see the world 
in different ways. The hypothesis that words influence perceptions directly applies to the 
                                                 
82 Claire Cozens, “Arnett Fired by NBC After Iraqi TV Outburst,” The Guardian, March 31, 2003, 
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news. As words are chosen and sentences put together to report the news they impact our 
perceptions of what is being reported.  
This bias in the news media can be problematic for democratic politics. Yi and 
Miklos reported that “journalists agree that ‘the central purpose of journalism is to 
provide citizens with accurate and reliable information they need to function in a free 
society.’”88 If media consumers use the news to educate themselves about what is 
happening in the world around them, and they are getting a biased version of the news, 
then they may learn or confirm that bias as well.  
B. PERSUASIVE NEWS AND PROPAGANDA 
The news media do not just report the facts of what has happened. They also 
“analyze, select, make comments, give their opinion and reflect their own attitudes,”89 
influencing public opinion. This is easily seen in news outlet’s use of subject matter 
experts who provide their insight and opinions about what is being reported. For those 
who subscribe to a particular bias in the news, what is said in the commentary 
accompanying the news can be perceived as the dominant view of a particular political 
party or community and part of what it means to be part of that party or community. 
Albert Gunther’s research found that the news media’s bias or slant, impacts the readers 
perception of public opinion.90 
Recent studies demonstrate the power of the media to sway people’s opinions. 
Jonathan McDonald Ladd and Gabriel S. Lenz found that a shift in four newspapers 
endorsement of political candidates in the UK led to a 10 to 25% shift in votes for the 
labor party.91 They recount how the newspaper’s shift in support was directed by Rupert 
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Murdoch, the owner, to gain policy concessions and a friendly regulatory environment 
from the newly supported candidate.92 This fact is particularly intriguing since one 
person directed this change in media bias which resulted in influencing media consumers. 
This implies that many citizens in countries with a free press are influenced by the elite 
who own news organizations, while in countries with less press freedom, the state may 
have more of a monopoly on persuasion in the news. In either case, their message is 
designed to persuade someone to do or support something. This type of communication 
can also be called propaganda. Joint Publication 3-.2, defines propaganda as “any form of 
adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to 
influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit 
the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.”93  
Edward Bernays is famous for his understanding and use of propaganda to sway 
public opinion. In his article “Manipulating Public Opinion: The Why and the How,” he 
argues that analysis must be done to determine the correct approach to presenting 
propaganda. He presents an example concerning discrimination in the southern United 
States and states that the location for a convention to discuss this topic along with the 
support of influential leaders was crucial to the spread of support of the topic. The 
location had to be in the South because it would add more credibility for those from the 
South. Bernays also added that inviting influential groups from around the country also 
helped influence public opinion. In the end, he says that because of the importance of all 
of the components of the convention as they were designed and reported, the topic gained 
interest and support as the public read about it in the papers.94 As Bernays points out in 
discussing a campaign for aid to Lithuania, 
that was waged to make 110,000,000 people in America realize that a 
small country on the Baltic was not simply a spot on the map. Lithuania 
was reflected to this country in its drama, music, literature, habits, 
economics and agriculture. The printed word and events created to 
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symbolize facts and ideas made America aware of the conditions in 
Lithuania and of its just aspirations. Ignorance was dissipated and 
sympathies strengthened to a point where these feelings became translated 
into action. Lithuania received economic aid and political recognition.95 
The news media often uses similar tactics to those mentioned above in its 
reporting of the news. The news media has been used repeatedly to spread nationalist 
propaganda in the past. The United States and Germany both used nationalist propaganda 
during World War II. The United States often used it to characterize the Japanese people 
as enemies, and the Germans to characterize the Jewish people as enemies. Next, I will 
examine more closes how nations were influenced by the newspapers in each country.  
1. U.S. Nationalist Propaganda in WWII 
On 15 Jan 1942, the U.S. government established a “Code of Wartime Practices 
for the American Press” which governed the “proper handling of news.”96 The code was 
well described by John Steinbeck as follows:  
The rules for correspondents [were both] imposed and self-imposed. 
There were no cowards in the American Army, and of all the brave men 
the private in the infantry was the bravest and noblest. The reason for this 
in terms of the War Effort was obvious. The infantry private had the 
dirtiest, weariest, least rewarding job in the whole war. In addition to 
being dangerous, a great many of the things he had to do were stupid. He 
must therefore be reassured that these things he knew to be stupid were 
actually necessary and wise, and that he was a hero for doing them... A 
second convention held that we had no cruel or ambitious or ignorant 
commanders. 
We were all a part of the War Effort. We went along with it, and not only 
that, we abetted it. Gradually it became a part of all of us that the truth 
about anything was automatically secret and that to trifle with it was to 
interfere with the War Effort. By this I don’t mean that the correspondents 
were liars... [but] it is in the things not mentioned that the untruth lies. 
We felt responsible to what was called the home front. There was a 
general feeling that unless the home front was carefully protected from the 
                                                 
95 Bernays, “Manipulating Public Opinion,” 967. 
96 “The War: Communication,” WETA, September, 2007, http://www.pbs.org/thewar/
at_home_communication_news_censorship.htm.  
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whole account of what war was like, it might panic. Also, we felt we had 
to protect the armed services from criticism, or they might retire to their 
tents to sulk like Achilles.97 
The news was not only reported as Steinbeck described above, to boost morale at 
home and contribute to the war efforts. The Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Ernie Pyle 
provided detailed accounts of his time on the front lines. Many of his columns contained 
derogatory wording and likened the adversary to an animal. In the sample of his work 
below, he used the derogatory term “Jap” to refer to the Japanese while likening them to 
wild animals swinging from coconut trees. This corresponds with posters made at the 
time depicting the Japanese as monkeys.98 
Fighting the Japs is like fighting a wild animal. The troops said the Jap is 
not afraid to die, it is an honor to die for the Emperor, he is their God. A 
lot of the fighting is done at night and you can smell the Japs 25 yards 
away... The Japs watch from coconut trees in the daytime and then when it 
becomes dark they sneak into your foxhole and cut your throat or throw in 
a hand grenade...The Japs take all kinds of chances, they love to die. Our 
troops are advancing very slowly. It is a savage campaign...You also hear 
all sorts of noises made by animals and you think it is the Japs.99 
Columns like this helped shape the American public’s perception of the enemy. 
They transformed the Japanese soldier into an animal to be killed. The news from the 
front told stories of the heroism of the U.S. soldiers. All of this was designed to helped 
bolster American nationalism and support at home for the war efforts. These efforts 
eventually culminated in creation of the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) on 13 
June 1942 to collect, censor and disseminate news concerning the war efforts,100 which 
was responsible for propaganda in the United States and abroad.  
                                                 
97WETA, “The War: Communication.” 
98 Anthony V. Navarro, “A Critical Comparison Between Japanese and American Propaganda during 
World War II,” Michigan State University, accessed November 7, 2017, https://www. msu. edu/~ navarro6/
srop. html.  
99 Ernie Pyle, July 15, 1943 quoted in”Samples from the columns of war correspondent Ernie Pyle,” 
The War, 2007, http://www.pbs.org/thewar/detail_5238.htm.  
100 “June 13, 1942: The Office of War Information is Created,” The National WWII Museum, June 
13, 2012, http://www.nww2m.com/2012/06/june-13-1942-the-office-of-war-information-is-created/.  
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2. German Propaganda in WWII 
The United States was not the only country in World War II to use propaganda to 
boost nationalism. Germany’s Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels studied the 
works of Edward Bernays and used his teachings to create a “‘Führer cult’ around Adolf 
Hitler.”101 Germany’s propaganda was similar to the United States in that it was 
designed to build support for the dominant party and to dehumanize the enemy, likening 
the Jewish people to animals to be killed. Germany also censored its press in similar ways 
to the United States, although Germany went much further in 1933 by documenting the 
race of editors and journalists in order to exclude Jewish people from the profession.102 
The German press printed articles in the newspapers similar to the U.S. articles 
concerning the Japanese. The excerpts below are from one of Goebbels’ essays published 
in the Der Angriff on 30 July 1928. In the first excerpt, Goebbels demeans the Jewish 
people and blames them for the German defeat in World War I. The second excerpt is 
one of many examples of Goebbels demeaning the Jewish people and comparing them to 
demons or animals. The final excerpt shows the call for nationalism while establishing 
the Jewish people as the enemy. 
The Jew has corrupted our race, soiled our morals, undermined our values, 
and broken our strength. He is the reason we today are the pariah of the 
whole world.103 
The Jew is the plastic demon of decay. Where he senses filth and decay, 
he appears from his hiding place and begins his criminal slaughter of the 
peoples. He puts on a mask of friendship before those he wants to betray, 
without the innocent victim noticing that his neck is already broken.104 
                                                 
101 Richard Gunderman, “The Manipulation of the American Mind: Edward Bernays and the Birth of 
Public Relations,” The Conversation, July 9, 2015, http://theconversation.com/the-manipulation-of-the-
american-mind-edward-bernays-and-the-birth-of-public-relations-44393. 
102 “Holocaust Encyclopedia: Ministry of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment,” United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed November 7, 2017, https://www.ushmm.org/collections/ask-a-
research-question/how-to-cite-museum-materials#website.  
103 Joseph Goebbels, “Why do we Oppose the Jews?” Der Angriff, July 30, 1928, trans. German 
Propaganda Archive, 2016, http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/angrif17.htm. 
104 Goebbels, “Why do we Oppose the Jews?” 
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What does anti-Semitism have to do with nationalism? I ask the opposite: 
What does the Jew have to do with nationalism? Nationalism is the 
doctrine of blood, of race. The Jew is the enemy and destroyer of unified 
blood, the conscious destroyer of our race. We are nationalists who oppose 
the Jew because we see in the Hebrew the eternal enemy of our national 
honor and our ethnic freedom.105 
Goebbels produced many essays that were printed in newspapers and read in radio 
broadcasts. Randall Bytwerk’s German Propaganda Archive106 provides plenty of these 
translated news articles and essays, as well as many from other Nazi leaders used to 
influence German nationalism. 
These examples demonstrate the power of the news media to influence its 
consumers. The news media often possesses a bias in their narrative, whether intentional 
or accidental, that influence how people perceive the news being reported to them. News 
outlets also selectively censor themselves thereby creating added biases. Finally, as 
demonstrated by the United States and Germany in World War II, countries use 
nationalist terminology in the news to spread nationalist attitudes often by using 
propaganda to heighten animosities towards the enemies. 
In the sections that follow, I argue that the mass media generate systematic 
influences on nationalist attitudes. Specifically, that when news is presented in nationalist 
terms, it tends to reinforce and increase existing nationalist attitudes. At the same time, 
state censorship can limit political opposition and the production of rival nationalist 
attitudes. Mass media in countries with state censorship will therefore still produce 
nationalist terminology but it will be at a lower rate because, due to censorship, it does 
not have to compete with rival nationalist attitudes that may be fighting for political 
representation. I argue that countries with a low press freedom will therefore have lower 
levels of nationalist text in their news media.  
The next chapter will provide evidence demonstrating the relationship between 
press freedom and levels of nationalist terminology used in online news media, as well as 
                                                 
105 Goebbels, “Why do we Oppose the Jews?” 
106 Randall Bytwerk, “Nazi and East German Propaganda Guide Page,” German Propaganda Archive, 
2016, http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/index.htm. 
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the relationship between levels of nationalist terminology in the media and levels of 
nationalist attitudes amongst a country’s population. Based on the argument presented so 
far, I present the following hypotheses:  
1. Countries with a free press will experience higher levels of nationalist 
terminology in online news media, while nations with a censored press 
will experience lower levels.  
2. Higher levels of nationalist terminology in the online news media within a 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 29 
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The quantitative research in this thesis utilizes data from varying sources to 
conduct regression analysis. The sources vary from online databases of economic 
development indicators to records of world news media content. Software developed 
through the “R” language for statistical computing is then used to organize the data into 
variables that can be input into regression models. The following chapter details the 
software used to analyze the data, the dependent and independent variables, and the 
logistic and beta regression models. 
Since this thesis uses separate models and variables to analyze Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2, this section will explain the variables and regression types categorized by 
hypothesis. Starting with the hypothesis that a nation’s press freedom level is associated 
with the production of nationalist terminology, I will describe the variables and 
regression models used to analyze this relationship. Then, I will explain the variables and 
models used to examine the hypothesis that nationalist terminology in online news are 
associated with higher levels of nationalist attitudes within a country.  
A. HYPOTHESIS ONE 
The following variables are used in a beta regression to answer Hypothesis 1. The 
dependent variable is the level of nationalist terminology in the online news media. The 
tested independent variable is press freedom and the independent control variables are 
regime type, population density and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
1. Dependent Variables 
Levels of word use in a database of global online news media are used to establish 
the dependent variable of Nationalist Terminology. To do this, I chose some sentiment 
words and some nationalistic words (Table 1) as evaluation criteria against a database of 
worldwide online news articles. Frequent variations of the same word such as foreigner 
and foreigners are grouped together and included in the aggregate number of occurrences. 
The news article database consists of over 830 million articles that span the period 2013–
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2015. The articles are untranslated and categorized by country, language, date, and other 
factors. To create the data set needed for this thesis, a separate Python script is used to 
translate the nationalist and sentiment words into 80 different languages using Google 
Translate.107 A scan is then performed on the news media database to find every 
occurrence of the words based on all of the translated versions. The Python script then 
tabulates each occurrence of the identified concepts by country-day and records the 
following data: the total number of online articles per country-day, the total number of 
media sources per country-day, and the total number of languages per country-day. This 
produced a comma separated value (.csv) file for use in the R software package. An R 
script was developed to establish the proportion of the total news articles per country-
year by dividing the observations for each conceptual category by the total number of 
articles. The proportion of articles referencing each of these 12 concepts within each 
country-year are then used as the dependent variables to capture the level of nationalist 
terminology present in the online news media. 
Table 1. Nationalist and Sentiment Words 
Words and variants 
Good  
Bad 




Foreign Foreigner Foreigners  
Invader Invade Invades Invaders Invaded Invading Invasion 




                                                 
107 “Google Translate,” Google, accessed October 27, 2017, https://translate.google.com/. 
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2. Independent Variables 
The independent variable measuring press freedom was established using 
Freedom House’s data set.108 This variable analyzes censorship’s influence on media 
narratives. Freedom house reports press freedom by coding each country as free, partly 
free, or not free. This is converted into two dichotomous variables, resulting in a 
dichotomous variable for a Free Press and a dichotomous variable for a Not Free Press. 
Those nations with a reported free press are recorded as a 1 and all others as a 0 in the 
Free Press variable; while those nations with a not free press are scored as 1 and all 
others as 0 for the Not Free Press variable.  
The first control variable for Hypothesis 1 is logged Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)109 as reported by the
 
World Bank. The World Bank tracks and reports the GDP 
based on the “sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products.”110 The 
control variable of logged Population Density also comes from the World Bank. The 
World Bank tracks and reports population density based on the “midyear population 
divided by land area in square kilometers.”111 Due to the heavy tailed nature of these 
variables, they have a logarithm applied to them which reduces the heavy tails and 
improves the distribution for modeling. 
The Polity IV Project112 data set is used to establish regime type as an 
independent control variable. The Polity IV Project data provides a polity score ranging 
from -10 to +10 that determines autocratic and democratic states. Those countries scoring 
-6 to -10 are categorized as autocratic and those scoring +6 through +10 are categorized 
                                                 
108”Freedom of the Press 2016.” 
109 “GDP per Capita (Current US$),” The World Bank, accessed June 17, 2017, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?view=chart. 
110 “GDP per Capita (Current US$).” 
111 “Population density (People per sq. km of Land Area),” The World Bank, accessed June 17, 2017, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST. 
112 “INSCR Data Page,” Center for Systemic Peace, 2017, http://www.systemicpeace.org/
inscrdata.html. 
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as democratic.113 This measure is converted into two dichotomous variables. The first 
variable is Autocracy and scores all autocratic countries as a 1. The second variable is 
Democracy and scores all democracies as a 1. In both dichotomous variables those 
countries not scored a 1 score a 0.  
3. Beta Regression Model 
Because the dependent variable of Nationalist Terminology is a proportional value 
as previously described, a beta regression provides the best option for statistical analysis. 
Beta regression is best suited for dependent variables with a value that ranges between 0 
and 1 without any value equaling 0 or 1.114 The variables are organized into three model 
forms which analyze the relationship between press freedom and nationalist terminology 
used in the media. Each concept from the Nationalist Terminology list is treated as a 
separate dependent variable and modeled with the independent variables as follows. 
Model Form 1 includes the independent variables: GDP, Population Density, Autocracy, 
and Democracy. Model Form 2 adds the variables Free Press and Not Free Press. 
Finally, because of a possible interaction between an autocracy and a not free press, I 
included a variable to account for this in Model Form 3. All three model forms included a 
variable of the logged total number of news articles. The results from these models are 
reported in Table 2. The next chapter will provide analysis of the results from the three 
regression models produced for each conceptual category.  
B. HYPOTHESIS TWO 
To examine the hypothesis that nationalist terminology is associated with higher 
levels of nationalist attitudes within a country, the following variables are used. First, the 
dependent variable measuring nationalist attitudes is established. Next the independent 
variables are established. To simplify modeling, the independent variables are grouped 
                                                 
113 “The Polity Project,” Center for Systemic Peace, 2016, http://www.systemicpeace.org/
polityproject.html. 
114 Francisco Cribari-Neto and Achim Zeileis, “Beta Regression in R,” Journal of Statistical Software 
34, no. 2 (October 2010): 3, 10.18637/jss.v034.i02. 
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into the categories: individual control variables, country level control variables, and 
tested media narrative variables.  
1. Dependent Variable 
To establish the dependent variable of Nationalist Attitude, I used responses to 
the World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 6. This free online data set contains anonymized 
survey responses from over 90,000 respondents in 57 countries from 2010 through 
2014.115 A positive response to three questions in the survey—V39, V211, and V214—
are used to establish respondents as more nationalistic than someone who did not respond 
positively to the same three questions. V39 asked respondents to list whom they would 
not like to have as their neighbors. A positive response for this question indicated the 
respondent identified “immigrants/foreign workers” in response and was coded as a 1.116 
Responses were coded as 0 if the respondent did not identify immigrants. V211 asked 
respondents how “proud” they were to “be [French],” where French represented the 
nationality from where the survey was conducted.117 A proud response was coded as a 1, 
while a not proud or “I am not [French]” response was coded as a 0. V214 asked 
respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement “I see myself as part of the 
[French] nation.”118 Again, French was substituted with the nationality of the country 
where the survey was conducted. An “Agree” or “Strongly agree” response was coded as 
a 1, while a “Disagree” or “Strongly disagree” response was coded as a 0. The responses 
to these questions were used to establish the dichotomous dependent variable of 
Nationalist Attitude. Those respondents who are coded with a 1 for all three questions are 
identified as individuals with a nationalist attitude; all other respondents are identified as 
not having a nationalist attitude and coded 0. All responses in the WVS with a response 
of -1 through -5 representing “missing, not asked, not applicable, no answer, or don’t 
                                                 
115 “Documentation for download,” accessed June 17, 2017, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
WVSContents.jsp.  





know” were changed to N/A. A map of the proportion of Nationalist Attitude is provided 
in Figure 1. This map displays countries with a low proportion of Nationalist Attitude as 
blue and countries with a high proportion of Nationalist Attitude as red.  
Figure 1.  Map of the Proportion of WVS Respondents with Nationalist 
Attitudes119 
 
This map displays the proportion of Nationalist Attitude based on country, between 2010 
and 2014. Countries in blue have a lower proportion of nationalist response than countries 
in red and range from 0 to 0.557. 
                                                 
119 Nationalist Attitude data was collected using the methods detailed in Chapter IV. A R script was 
created to code and plot the data on the map. 
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2. Independent Variables 
The first category of independent variables is the tested variable of Nationalist 
Terminology. These variables are very similar to the dependent variable in Hypothesis 1 
with one exception. The 12 concepts are aggregated by country only, instead of country-
year. This was done due to the limited timespan of the media content data and fact that 
the WVS data comes from a limited number of countries over particular years. Because 
the WVS and media data time frame do not completely overlap, organizing the data 
cross-sectionally (by country) ensures there is adequate data available to model. 
Fortunately, when examining the WVS nationalism data, I found that levels of 
nationalism did not vary significantly over short periods of time,120 which gives 
additional credence to the cross-sectional approach. Future research should attempt to 
minimize this issue. A map of the proportion of news articles containing the concept of 
nation is provided in Figure 2. This map displays countries with a low use of the concept 
as blue and countries with a high use as red. The map provides a visualization of the level 
of nationalist discussion happening within a country’s news media.  
                                                 
120 I created an R script to compare reported nationalism based on the same criteria in this thesis. This 
script compared nationalism levels from WVS wave 5 and wave 6. This script showed mostly small 
changes in nationalism between surveys.  
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Figure 2.  Proportion of Articles Using the Concept of Nation in  
Online News Media121 
 
This map displays each countries proportion of online news articles using the concept of 
nation. Countries in blue have a lower proportion than countries in red and range from 
4.42e-05 to 0.0779. 
The category of individual control variables includes additional responses 
recorded in the WVS. This data represents the respondent’s level of Internet access, age, 
                                                 
121 Data to represent the concept of nation was collected using the methods detailed in Chapter IV. A 
R script was created to code and plot the data on the map. 
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wealth and population density where they live. The independent variable, Internet 
Access, is developed using responses to the WVS question V223, concerning how 
frequently the respondent had access to the Internet. Responses indicate access “Daily, 
Weekly, Monthly, Less than monthly, and Never.” I create a dichotomous Internet 
variable based on access to the Internet at least monthly.   
The independent variable measuring respondent age is based on responses to the 
WVS question V242. I create dichotomous variables for both Young and Old. Those who 
were between the age 16 and 30 are scored a 1 and all others scored a 0 for the Young 
variable. For the Old variable those over 60 are scored a 1 and all others scored a 0.  
Reported wealth levels from the WVS were used to establish dichotomous 
variables for Rich and Poor. Respondents were asked to report their household income 
level from 1 to 10, with 1 being the lowest levels of income and 10 being the highest 
levels of income. When viewing the histogram of reported wealth, three aggregate 
categories were apparent. The dichotomous variables for poor and rich are based on these 
categories. Those who reported income levels of 1 or 2 score a 1 and all others score a 0 
for the variable Poor. Those who reported a 9 or 10 score a 1 and all others score a 0 for 
the variable Rich.  
The last variable in this category is population density of the respondent. 
Population data based on the respondent’s city as reported in the WVS are used to 
establish whether the respondent lived in an Urban or rural area. Populations over 50,000 
are classified as urban and scored a 1, and those under 50,000 classified as rural and 
scored a 0.  
The final category of independent control variables is based on country level data. 
The variables include GDP, Population Density, Free Press, Not Free Press, Autocracy, 
and Democracy. Each of these variables are described in the section discussing 
Hypothesis 1, and are organized and measured in the same manner.  
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3. Logistic Regression Model 
Hypothesis 2 is tested using logistic regression models to analyze the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables. This is done because the dependent 
variable of Nationalist Attitude was organized into a dichotomous measure. A logistic 
regression is more appropriate to use with a binary dependent variable.  
Prior to developing the final models for this Hypothesis, I first conducted a series 
of logistic regressions to evaluate the concepts used in the variable Nationalist 
Terminology. This helped determine if there were combinations of concepts that would 
be more effective than the use of all the concepts together. To do this I conducted logistic 
regressions with the dependent variable, Nationalist Attitude, and the following 
categories of concepts. I first modeled variations of the concepts country, foreign and 
nation along with all control variables. The next models included variations of only 
sentiment words, followed by models which combined sentiment and country words.  
The final model included all concepts and control variables and resulted in the 
best model with the lowest ‘Akaike Information Criterion’ (AIC) scores. AIC compares 
models for best predictive fit while penalizing for added variables. Models with a lower 
AIC value are preferred because they generate greater levels of predictive success. 
Because of these results, when evaluating the effects of Nationalist Terminology on 
Nationalist Attitudes in the next set of models, all of the measured concepts were used in 
combined models. 
The next set of logistic regression models are reported in Table 3. These models 
tested the effects of individual level, country level, and nationalist concept independent 
variables on the dependent variable of Nationalist Attitude. Model 4 tests all individual 
level control variables. I then added the country level control variables to Model 5. 
Nationalist Terminology variables are added in Model 6. Finally, because of a possible 
interaction between Autocracy and Not Free Press, Model 7 accounts for this possibility 
with an added interaction variable. The results from these models are discussed in the 
next chapter.  
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V. RESULTS  
The methodology described in the previous chapter produced statistically 
significant regression results for both hypotheses. This chapter will examine the selection 
process of the best models for each hypothesis as well as the results derived from these 
models.  
A. PRESS FREEDOM AND MEDIA NARRATIVES 
In Hypothesis 1, I predict that countries with a free press will experience higher 
levels of nationalist terminology in online news media while nations with a censored 
press will experience lower levels. This prediction is tested using three forms of beta 
regression models to analyze the relationship between independent variables GDP, 
Population Density, Autocracy, Democracy, Free Press and Not Free Press, and the 
dependent variables of Nationalist Terminology in the media. All three model forms are 
used with each concept from the Nationalist Terminology list as a dependent variable and 
all produce results with a p-value of less than 0.01 for all independent variables. Finally, 
the three models’ AIC scores are compared resulting in Model Form 2 having the lowest 
AIC score. These results were observed across all concepts tested, demonstrating that 
Model Form 2, which includes all variables except the variable for the interaction 
between Autocracy and Not Free Press, gives the best fit to the data. 
The models reported in Table 2 demonstrate some interesting trends. First, the 
polity variables of Autocracy and Democracy had the largest effects across all concepts. 
Autocracy has a strong positive relationship and Democracy a strong negative 
relationship to the following Nationalist Terminology concepts: bad, love, like, hate, 
good, country, enemy, foreign, invader and republic. However, the concept fear presents 
opposite findings, with a strong negative relationship to Autocracy and a strong positive 
relationship to Democracy. Finally, the concept of nation displayed a strong negative 
relationship with both Autocracy and Democracy suggesting that “anocratic” countries 
that are not considered a democracy or autocracy have the highest levels of this concept. 
The results from the country, fear, and nation models can be found in Table 2.  
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These models also show a strong positive or negative relationship to press 
freedom based on what concept is used as the dependent variable. Of interest is the fact 
that the variable Free Press and the variable Not Free Press both display a strong 
positive relationship with the concepts of nation and republic and a strong negative 
relationship with the concepts bad, like, good, fear, country, enemy and foreign. This 
suggests that for the concepts nation and republic, both a censored and free press 
experience higher levels of these concepts than a partly free press does. In contrast, the 
negative relationship seen with the concepts bad, like, good, fear, country, enemy and 
foreign and both press freedom variables suggests that a partly free press produces higher 
levels of these words. The Free Press variable accounts for the largest regression 
coefficient for the concept of fear, and both press freedom variables are statistically 
significant (p < 0.01) across the full range of concepts.  
While the strong relationships discussed so far may demonstrate a correlation 
between press freedom and use of nationalist terminology in the online news media 
within a given country, given that a partly free press experiences higher levels of the 
majority of the tested concepts, I must reject Hypothesis 1, which predicted that countries 
with a free press will experience higher levels of nationalist terminology in online news 
media while nations with a censored press will experience lower levels. The findings do 
however appear to support Snyder and Ballentine’s argument that “when markets are 
imperfect, increased freedom of speech will tend to exacerbate nationalist mythmaking 
unless institutions and norms correct the flaws in the market.”122 Here Snyder and 
Ballentine are referring to the mass media market place of ideas and they argue that as 
democracies grow, institutions are set up to professionalize the mass media which helps 
reduce biases and inaccuracies. The finding that a partly free press had the highest levels 
of nationalist terminology supports their argument that early democracies experience 
higher levels of nationalist mythmaking. 
The control variables of GDP and Population Density also produce statistically 
significant results showing a strong relationship to the dependent variables. GDP displays a 
                                                 
122 Snyder and Ballentine, “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,” 22. 
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strong positive relationship to the concepts bad, foreign and republic, and a strong negative 
relationship to the rest; while population density displays a strong negative relationship to 
the concepts bad, fear, enemy, and nation, and a strong positive relationship to the rest. The 
results for these variables, however, failed to show any clear patterns. 
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R
2
 0.036 0.061 0.023 
Log Likelihood 3,058,480,339.000 2,592,318,034.000 2,326,120,203.000 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
B. MEDIA NARRATIVES AND NATIONALIST ATTITUDES 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that higher levels of nationalist terminology in the online 
news media produce higher levels of nationalist attitude within a country. This prediction 
 42 
is tested using four logistic regression models to analyze the relationship between 
independent variables organized into individual, country, and nationalist terminology 
categories as described in the methods section. The results from these models are 
presented in Table 3. 
To further test the models, receiver operating characteristic (ROC)123 curves are 
plotted for each model to determine the true positive and false positive rates for each. 
This test confirmed Model 7, which includes all individual-level, country-level, and 
interaction variables, as well as all categories of Nationalist Terminology, as the best 
model with the highest AUC statistic. The ROC curves in Figure 3 show each models 
curve plotted in a different color.  
Figure 3.  Hypothesis 2 ROC Plot 
 
This plot provides a visual presentation of the receiver operating characteristic curves for 
Models 4–7 in Table 3.  
                                                 
123 ROC curves display the true positive rates of a model. Models with a higher Area Under the Curve 
(AUC) statistic, are preferred.  
 
 43 
While Model 7 showed the best predictive performance, it is important to note 
that the other models also produced similar statistically significant results. The 
individual-level independent variables Internet, Urban, Rich and Poor maintained their 
significance across all models, while the variables Young and Old were only statistically 
significant in Model 4. Those who reported having Internet access, living in an urban area 
or being poor showed substantially lower rates of nationalist attitudes.  
Country-level variables are added in Models 5, 6 and 7. In these models the 
variable Free Press show a consistent strong negative relationship, while the variable Not 
Free Press and Population Density show a strong positive relationship to nationalist 
attitudes. The variables for Autocracy and Democracy fluctuate between a negative to a 
positive relationship in the different models. GDP shows no significance in Model 5 but 
in Model 6 and 7 has strong positive coefficients with a p-value of less than 0.01 in both.  
The concepts capturing Nationalist Terminology are added in Model 6 and Model 
7, with Model 7 including an additional variable to account for an interactive relationship 
between the variables Autocracy and Not Free Press. Except for the concept love in 
Model 6, all Nationalist Terminology variables are statistically significant across both 
Models 6 and 7 with p-values of less than 0.01 and maintain consistent positive or 
negative relationships across all specifications.  
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(0.084) (0.134) (0.215) (0.231) 
Observations 66,304 59,083 54,934 54,934 
Log Likelihood -34,565.800 -30,398.760 -27,626.240 -27,545.840 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 69,147.600 60,825.520 55,304.490 55,145.690 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Model 7 demonstrates strong positive associations with the use of the concepts for 
love, enemy, country, foreign, invader, and nation. As the use of these words increases in 
online news media, the probability of respondents answering WVS questions with a 
nationalist attitude increases. The opposite affect can be said for the concepts of good, 
bad, fear, hate, like and republic, which all show a strong negative relationships to 
nationalist attitudes.  
Two concepts stood out from the rest as having consistently strong positive 
relationships to nationalist attitudes with the largest change in probability of nationalist 
attitudes. These are the concepts of invader and country. A visualization of the fit of 
Model 7, showing the effects of increased usage of both concepts, is provided in Figure 4, 
which shows the dependent variable Nationalist Attitude on the y-axis and the 
independent Nationalist Terminology variables for the concepts invader and country on 
each x-axis respectively. The shaded area around each blue line represents the 95% 
confidence interval for the estimated effect. These charts show that as the proportional 
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use of the concepts of invader and country in the online media go up, the probability of 
expressing nationalist attitudes also goes up significantly. The plots show that increasing 
the use of the concept invader in online news media, from its minimum observed value to 
its maximum, generates a shift in the predicted probability of nationalist attitudes from 
25% to 70%. The same shift in the usage of the concept of country generates a shift in the 
probability of nationalist attitudes from 25% to 75%.   
Figure 4.  Visualization of Model 7 Regression for the Concepts of 
Invader and Country. 
 
This figure displays estimated effects from Model 7 with the Nationalist Terminology 
(invader and country) on the x-axis and the dependent variable Nationalist Attitude on the 
y-axis. 
In general, the results from Model 7 support the hypothesis that higher levels of 
nationalist terminology in the online news media produce higher levels of nationalist 
attitudes within a country. It showed that as certain forms of Nationalist Terminology 
such as country, foreign, and invader, are used more frequently, the probability of a 
Nationalist Attitude goes up. It also showed that as the frequency of other forms of 
Nationalist Terminology such as bad, fear, or hate goes up, the probability of a 




The results presented in the previous chapter show some interesting findings. 
They fail to confirm Hypothesis 1, that countries with a free press will experience higher 
levels of nationalist terminology in online news media while nations with a censored 
press will experience lower levels. Instead, these results seem to provide evidence to 
confirm Snyder and Ballentine’s argument that countries experiencing new press freedom 
would experience higher levels of nationalist mythmaking in the media.124 This finding 
implies the need to establish mass media institutions to train journalists in professional 
reporting practices and to establish effective rules and regulations for the media 
environment. It may be in a country’s best interest to establish institutions ensuring the 
training of journalists and accuracy of reporting prior to increasing press freedom. This 
has the potential to restrict the increase in nationalist mythmaking by various groups 
competing for public support. Similarly, some countries may choose to use censorship in 
their new government to limit challenges to their own nationalist mythmaking such as the 
Nazis’ did as they rose to power.  
The statistically significant findings supporting Hypothesis 2, that higher levels of 
nationalist terminology in the online news media produce higher levels of nationalist 
attitudes within a country are interesting and relevant to the implications of Hypothesis 1. 
If what is said in the media can influence levels of nationalism, then influence over the 
media environment may be an important lever for change. However, a more effective 
solution may be to include formal education in primary schools on critical thinking skills 
teaching the population to identify media biases and propaganda. Of course, this would 
have to be a long term solution. 
The control variables also presented some interesting findings. The variable 
Internet showed a strong negative relationship with nationalist attitudes. This may be due 
to the ability to fact check the news through the use of the Internet. Countries that want to 
                                                 
124 Snyder and Ballentine, “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,” 22. 
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reduce levels of nationalism may try increasing access to the Internet, though this could 
also pose problems as access to social media may have the opposite effect. This will be 
discussed further in chapter VI. The variables Urban and Poor also showed strong 
negative relationships to Nationalist Attitudes while the variable Rich showed a strong 
positive relationship. These findings may help in targeting nationalist or anti-nationalist 
messaging.  
While censorship may not result in less Nationalist Terminology in the online 
news media, the variable Not Free Press does have a strong positive relationship with 
Nationalist Attitudes. I attribute this to the fact that countries that censor the media often 
practice nationalist propaganda as demonstrated through the examples from the United 
States and Germany in World War II. In these examples of nationalism, and all others 
that I encountered in my research, there is always an in-group that is good, and an out-
group that is blamed for all of the problems. Under censorship this is further increased, as 
the only message that is allowed is a positive one for the current form of government and 
a dehumanization of the enemy. Countries that choose to educate their citizens to look at 
information critically, should incorporate this lesson into their teachings.  
B. CAVEATS  
The findings presented here should also be taken with a few caveats. First, the 
concepts that were used to build the Nationalist Terminology variable were not filtered in 
any way. That is to say, any time the word “country” was used, it was included in the 
aggregate number. No attempt was made to directly associate these concepts with 
positive or negative sentiment. Articles discussing country music would also have been 
included in this count, which may not be ideal for statistical purposes. Second, as I have 
already mentioned, the time period of the WVS and the media data do not completely 
overlap. Expanded data would allow for more investigation of variation in nationalism 
over time. 
C. FUTURE STUDIES ON NATIONALISM 
Attempts to improve upon this thesis could start by addressing the caveats I have 
mentioned. This could be done by using completely overlapping data bases as they 
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become available and more detailed metrics to add sentiment analysis to filter out the 
versions of the nationalist terminology that are not true representations of nationalist 
concepts such as “country” when it refers to music or a rural location. Future research 
should also examine how social media effects levels of nationalism. Social media 
provides the opportunity for people to communicate with little censorship. Additionally, 
there are no educational requirements to start publishing information on social media. 
Because anyone can broadcast on social media without any education and because there 
are no centralized institutions to control the quality of information, one could argue that 
social media provides a fertile landscape for nationalist attitudes. Similar to Snyder and 
Ballentine’s description of the ‘imperfect marketplace’ that arises when new press 
freedoms produce rising forms of nationalism, I believe social media can be seen as an 
imperfect marketplace with dispersed parties fighting for power and control of the 
information with little or no controls over the quality of information. Since most people 
now have the ability to spread or follow nationalist narratives on social media and 
countries have been slow to institute professional controls, the nationalist discourse that 
can be found on social media today may be contributing to the rising nationalism 
observed in many countries.  
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